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I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past forty-odd years, the National Labor Relations 
Board1 has, aided and abetted by arbitrators and the circuit courts, 
developed at least three distinct interpretations of broad, general, no­
strike language, which depend more upon the type of strike involved 
than on the language used. While perhaps lengthy and somewhat re­
dundant, the typical no-strike language is hardly complex: 
The union agrees that it will not collectively, concertedly or individ­
ually engage in or participate, directly or indirectly, in any strike, 
slowdown, stoppage or any other interference with or interruption 
of the work or operations of the employer during the term of this 
agreement; and the employer agrees that during the term of this 
agreement it will not lock out any of the employees in the bargain­
ing unit covered by this agreement.2 
Its interpretation, however, has produced some of the most lengthy 
* Principal, Siegel, O'Connor & Kainen, P.C., Hartford, Connecticut. Chairman, 
Labor and Employment Law Section of Connecticut Bar Association 1977-78. B.S. Col­
lege of the Holy Cross, 1959; LL.B., Georgetown University, 1964. 
** Associate, Siegel, O'Connor & Kainen, P.C., Hartford, Connecticut. B.A. Mar­
shall University, 1976; M.B.A. University of New Haven, 1978; J.D. Western New Eng­
land College, 1984. 
1. Hereinafter referred to in text as the "Board" or "NLRB." 
2. Although it may vary from one collective bargaining agreement to another, this 
language is typical in contemporary labor agreements. 
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and contradictory of labor litigations. 3 
Arbitrators originally construed no-strike language narrowly.4 
By the early 1950s, however, the NLRB had become involved and the 
Board and the courts became locked in a battle as to what it truly 
means to agree not to strike. 
The debate over the proper interpretation of broad no-strike lan­
guage is complicated by the various environments in which the ques­
tion is presented. Arbitrators, usually the initial interpreters of 
contract language, operate in an informal (and legally favored) setting 
in which almost any evidence is admissible. s The NLRB, which has 
the power to interpret contractual language as part of its duty to en­
force the National Labor Relations Act, 6 constitutes a second type of 
contract interpreter. Finally, the courts join the process in deciding 
whether to enforce decisions of both arbitrators and the Board, as well 
as directly interpreting contracts under section 301 of the Labor Man­
agement Relations Act. 7 The courts, however, are bound by more 
stringent rules of evidence and case law which grant broad deference 
to arbitration and Board decisions. 8 
Further confusing this matter is the fact that the Supreme Court 
has not ruled in a closely analogous case since 19539 and the proper 
interpretation of that case is still being debated. lO Thus, parties are 
confronted with a convoluted array of arbitral, Board, and court deci­
sions which make it virtually impossible to predict accurately the legal 
rights of parties who have agreed to broad no-strike provisions as part 
of their labor contract. 
3. 	 See F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 46 (3d ed. 1973). 
4. 	 Id. 
5. 	 Id. at 254. Elkouri & Elkouri suggest: 
Although strict observance of legal rules of evidence usually is not required, 
the parties in all cases must be given adequate opportunity to present all of their 
evidence and argument. Arbitrators are usually extremely liberal in the reception 
of evidence, giving the parties a free hand in presenting any type of evidence 
thought to strengthen and clarify their case. 
Id. 
6. 	 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982). [Hereinafter referred to in text as the "Act]." 
7. 	 Labor Management Relations Act, § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982). 
8. United Steelworkers of Am. v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 46 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2414 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 
U.S. 574, 46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2416 (1960); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Enterprise 
Wheel and Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593,46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2423 (1960); Textile Workers v. 
Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 40 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2113 (1957). 
9. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 
(1953). 
10. See, e.g., International Union of Operating Eng'rs., Local 18, 238 N.L.R.B. 652, 
99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1307 (1978). 
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This article will explore the historic development of the interpre­
tation of no-strike clauses in labor agreements, analyzing the existing 
approaches in the various fora available for the resolution of contrac­
tual disputes. Special attention will be given to the conflicting analyses 
developed by the Board and the courts to determine the scope of broad 
no-strike provisions. Finally, the authors will comment on and, ifpos­
sible, synthesize these competing interpretations. 
n. ARBITRAL TREATMENT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES 
Labor arbitrators provided the initial contractual interpretations 
limiting, or entirely prohibiting, employees' right to strike during the 
term of an existing collective bargaining agreement. I I The arbitral 
prohibitions were implied from the very existence of the arbitration 
process itself, the empl()yer's agreement to arbitrate work disputes 
forcing the implication that the union would not strike until it had 
utilized this contractual dispute resolution process. The implied no­
strike limitations were narrowly applied to prohibit only strikes arising 
out of disputes subject to the contract's grievance and arbitration pro­
cedures. Limited restrictions were also placed on a union's ability to 
honor "illegitimate" picket lines of another union. Where, however, 
the contract contained express no-strike language, arbitrators held 
that fairness arid logic required the no-strike language to be given its 
plain, broad meaning, except in those cases in which strikers were mo­
tivated to honor picket lines by a reasonable fear of violence. 12 
The arbitration process is a simple proceeding, voluntarily chosen 
by parties who want a dispute determined by an impartial judge of 
their own mutual selection, whose decision, based on the merits of the 
case, they agree in advance to accept as final and binding. 13 This pro­
cess, which is favored by the courts as a "substitute for industrial 
strife,"'4 occurs in a more informal setting than courtroom litigation 
and does not require the strict observance of legal rules of evidence. 15 
Under these less formal procedures, arbitrators in early decisions 
implied the existence of no-strike commitments because of the parties' 
agreement to arbitrate disputes under the contract. 16 Such implied no­
11. For a discussion of the no-strike clause and arbitration, see ELKOURI & ELKoURI 
supra note 3, at 6, 46. 
12. See infra notes 16-49 and accompanying text. 
13. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 6-7. 
14. United Steelworkers of Am. v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 
578,466 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2416, 2418 (1960). 
15. ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra note 3, at 254. 
16. See, e.g., Waterfront Employees Ass'n., 4 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1117, 1117-18 (Mar. 
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strike clauses were given relatively narrow scope outside situations in 
which there was a direct dispute between an employer and its employ­
ees over the interpretation of an existing collective bargaining 
agreement. 17 
A test of "legitimacy" developed to determine whether implied 
no-strike clauses prohibited employees covered by· one collective bar­
gaining agreement from observing the picket lines of employees cov­
ered by another bargaining agreement, a practice known as 
sympathetic or sympathy strikes. IS As articulated by Arbitrator Kerr 
in Waterfront Employers' Association of Pacific Coast,19 legitimate 
picket lines are those which have "grown out of a good faith labor 
dispute. . . each case must be considered on its own merits and must 
be judged in the light of surrounding facts and circumstances individ­
ual to the case. "20 
From this case-by-case analysis, several types of "illegitimate" 
picket lines were identified, including "hot cargo" disputes,21 jurisdic­
tional disputes,22 demonstration picket lines,23 and collusive picket 
lines.24 Hot cargo disputes, found mainly in longshoremen operations, 
have been defined as "an effort to exert the pressure of obstructing 
loading and unloading of vessels on the employing stevedors and ship 
owners, for the purpose of assisting other crafts or unions in obtaining 
what they seek from other employers."2s In such cases, the arbitrators 
felt it unreasonable and not in the interest of labor or of the employ­
ers26 to disrupt the labor harmony between an employer and its em­
2, 1939) (Morse, Arb.); Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 
273, 277 (Aug. 12, 1947) (Kerr, Arb.). 
17. See O. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION 
62 (2d ed. 1983). 
18. See FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 547-49. 
19. 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273 (Aug. 12, 1947) (Kerr, Arb.). 
20. Id. at 274. 
21. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of San Francisco, 5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1177 (Aug. 
31, 1939) (Morse, Arb.); Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) at 274. 
22. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 275-76. 
23. Id. at 274; John R. Evans & Co., 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (Jan. 14, 1947) (Levy, 
Arb.). 
24. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 274-75; 
But see Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5, 14-15 (Nov. 
13, 1947) (Miller, Arb.) (amended 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 273, Arbitrator Kerr's definition of 
collusion based on the previous unreported Encinal decision ofArbitrator Morse). 
25. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of San Francisco, 5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1177, 1177 
(Aug. 31, 1939) (Morse, Arb.). 
26. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 275-76. 
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ployees because of a dispute which involved neither of these parties.27 
A jurisdictional dispute involves two unions arguing over which 
of them should represent a given group of employees. This was de­
clared to be an atypical labor dispute since it involved a disagreement 
between two labor factions rather than a disagreement between labor 
and employer.28 In such cases equity demanded that an employer not 
be penalized for a dispute to which it was not a party.29 
An example of demonstration picket lines can be found in John 
R. Evans & Co., 30 in which a picket line was established by an indus­
trial union to protest alleged police brutality encountered on the picket 
lines of another labor organization.31 Arbitrator Levy determined this 
picket line to be illegitimate because it did not result from a dispute 
between labor and any person or persons acting as an employer, but 
from an attempt to protest the non-labor activities of another 
organization.32 
Of particular interest in John R. Evans & Co. is the fact that the 
contract contained a very broad no-strike clause separate from the 
grievance procedure of the contract. 
The "no-strike clause" contained in the present contract is one of 
the broadest which the Chairman has seen. It is also quite plainly 
and specifically worded. It would seem inescapable that a protest 
walkout, although not involving any dispute with the immediate 
employer and having for its purpose participation in a community 
demonstration upon what the employees believe to be a vital ques­
tion, comes within the purview of a contractual clause providing 
that "there shall be no strikes, stoppages of work or slowdowns of 
any kind whatsoever."33 
Faced with one of the first reported decisions interpreting express no­
strike language, Arbitrator Levy relied not only on the illegitimacy of 
the picket line, but also on the plain meaning of the broad words of the 
no-strike clause to prohibit concerted refusals to work, even if the re­
fusals did not result from disputes between the immediate employer 
and its employees. 34 
The last of the early illegitimate or collusive picket lines involved 
27. Id. at 274. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414 (Jan. 14, 1947) (Levy, Arb.). 
31. Id.at419. 
32. Id. at 418-19. 
33. Id. at 418. 
34. !d. 
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situations in which two unions, one a party to an agreement and the 
other not a party to the agreement, would decide that the nonparty 
union would strike and establish picket lines which would then make 
it possible for the party union to engage in a work stoppage by honor­
ing the nonparty union's picket line.35 The definition of a collusive 
picket line was further clarified in a later arbitration decision amend­
ing Arbitrator Kerr's award. In this subsequent Waterfront Employ­
ers' Association of Pacific Coast36 case, Arbitrator Miller stated: 
[W]hile granting the longshoremen a measure of freedom from the 
contractual restraint against work stoppages, to permit them to con­
form to traditional union principles in observing the legitimate 
picket lines of other unions, [the Encinal case] was carefully limited 
against possible abuse. It was never intended to sanction such con­
duct when picket lines are established as part of a collusive plan or 
strategy having as one of its objects either the securing of some spe­
cific gain or advantage to the longshoremen themselves, whether in­
dividually or collectively as a union organization, or the use of the 
economic force of the longshoremen as an aggressive weapon on 
behalf of some affiliated union or group.37 
According to Arbitrator Miller, a union under an implied no-strike 
provision was free to observe picket lines in order to protect the gen­
eral interest common to all union members to refrain from aiding an 
employer to defeat the strike efforts of its employees, but not to serve 
specific self-interests of the observing unions.38 
Taken as a whole, the arbitrators in these early decisions were 
willing to imply no-strike prohibitions in cases where parties had 
agreed to settle disputes by arbitration. The scope of such implied 
provisions was limited, however, except for a few special circum­
stances, to disputes between the primary employer and its employ­
ees. 39 When the contract contained separate express no-strike 
language, such language was interpreted rather broadly based on the 
plain meaning of the language used.4O 
The use of plain language to interpret express, general no-strike 
provisions is further demonstrated in New England Master Textile En­
35. Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 8 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 274-75. 
36. 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 5 (Nov. 13, 1947) (Miller, Arb.). 
37. Id. at 14. 
38. Id. at 15. 
39. See, e.g., Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of San Francisco, 5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
(Aug. 31, 1939) (Morse, Arb.); Waterfront Employers' Ass'n. of Pacific Coast, 9 Lab. Arb. 
(BNA) at 5. 
40. John R. Evans & Co., 6 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 418. 
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gravers Guild,41 in which Arbitrator Wallen accepted the company's 
position that no-strike language, which read "[t]here shall be no 
strikes, stoppages of work or slowdowns by the employees nor any 
lockouts by the Employers during the life of this agreement," specifi­
cally prohibited sympathetic work stoppages.42 In a short opinion the 
arbitrator stated: "The contract between the Guild and the United 
Textile Workers forbids stoppages of work during its life .... In the 
arbitrator's view, neither fairness nor logic supports the Union's 
claim. . . . "43 Looking at nothing but the contract language itself, 
then, Arbitrator Wallen had no difficulty in deciding that the union 
sympathy strike violated the contract's general no-strike clause. 
Later decisions, however, provided for an exception to this broad 
interpretation of express no-strike language. In Pilot Freight Carriers, 
Inc.,44 the company claimed it could discipline sympathy strikers, 
whose actions violated the contract, regardless of the employees' rea­
son for honoring the stranger union's picket line.45 Arbitrator Maggs 
found the no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining agree­
ment to prohibit employees from honoring picket lines established by 
other unions but he also found that the employer was not allowed to 
discipline employees who honored such picket lines if the employees 
were motivated by reasonable fear of violence in crossing the line.46 
He further concluded, however, that in this particular case the em­
ployees had no reason to fear for their physical safety and, therefore, 
the company's discipline, though not its strict contract interpretation, 
was upheld.47 
More recent arbitration decisions tend to follow the general rule 
that no-strike provisions that are a part of or closely related to the 
grievance procedure of the contract are similar to implied no-strike 
clauses and are interpreted narrowly to proscribe only work stoppages 
that arise out of disputes between the primary employer and its em­
ployees.48 Where, however, the no-strike provisions are separate from 
the grievance and arbitration provisions of the contract, the no-strike 
prohibitions are interpreted broadly based on the plain language of the 
41. 9 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 199 (Sept. 22, 1947) (Wallen, Arb.). 
42. Id. at 199. 
43. Id. at 201. 
44. 22 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 761 (June 21, 1954) (Maggs, Arb.). 
45. Id. at 762. 
46. Id. at 765. 
47. Id. 
48. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., 35 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 757, 778-79 (Dec. 31, 1960) 
(Miller, Arb.). 
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contract.49 
III. THE BOARD'S TREATMENT OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSES 
The NLRB provides a second line of authority for the interpreta­
tion of express no-strike language. The results, if not the actual analy­
sis, of the Board's early decisions were not substantially different from 
those arrived at by arbitrators. Implied no-strike provisions were con­
strued narrowly and employees were not allowed to honor "illegiti­
mate" picket lines. 50 The Board, however, failed to act on its initial 
opportunity to rule on whether sympathy strikes violated express no­
strike provisions and decided the case on other grounds. 51 The Board 
also identified a new type of strike, the unfair labor practice strike, 
which it decided was not prohibited by general no-strike obligations. 52 
The Supreme Court refused to enforce the Board's sympathy strike 
treatment, finding that the broad no-strike provision in question pro­
hibited sympathy strikes, but it accepted the Board's special treatment 
of unfair labor practice strikes. 53 The Board followed the Court's lead 
regarding sympathy strikes for several years before it radically 
changed its position on express no-strike language based on another 
doctrine developed by the Court in cases dealing with implied no­
strike provisions. 54 
In Rockaway News Supply Co. ,55 the Board was asked to interpret 
broad no-strike provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. The 
Board did not, however, deal with the contractual no-strike language 
directly, but rather it concluded that the entire contract was void due 
to the overbreadth of its union security clause. 56 This case becomes 
important, not because of the Board's decision, but because both the 
49. National Homes Mfg. Co., 72 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1127, 1129-30 (June 19, 1979) 
(Goodstein, Arb.); Westinghouse Transport Leasing Corp., 69 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1210, 
1213 (Dec. 7, 1977) (Sergent, Arb.). 
50. Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 337, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1314, 
1315 (1951), enforcement denied on other grounds, 197 F.2d 111, 30 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2119 
(2d Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (1953). 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 80-81, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
2432, 2436 (1953). 
54. See infra notes 55-99 and accompanying text. 
55. 95 N.L.R.B. 336, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1314 (1951), enforcement denied on other 
grounds, 197 F.2d 111, 30 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2119 (2d Cir. 1952), affd, 345 U.S. 71,31 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (1953). 
56. Id. at 337, 28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1315. 
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court of appeals57 and the United States Supreme Court58 found that 
the contract as a whole was not void and that the key to the question 
of whether the company had committed an unfair labor practice was 
the interpretation of the contract's broad no-strike provision. The 
United States Supreme Court determined that the no-strike language 
contained in the Rockaway News collective bargaining agreement cov­
ered not only direct economic strikes against the employer but also 
sympathetic strikes in support of the picket lines of another striking 
union. 59 
At the same time the Court was deciding that the broad no-strike 
language of Rockaway News prohibited sympathy strikes, the Board 
was determining whether strikes in protest over an employer's unfair 
labor practices were similarly prohibited by broad no-strike language. 
In Mastro Plastics Corp., 60 rendered four days after the Court's hold­
ing in Rockaway News, the NLRB determined that strikes called in 
protest of employer unfair labor practices were not a breach of con­
tractual no-strike clauses and constituted protected, concerted activity 
on the part of employees.61 
The strike in Mastro Plastics Corp. was precipitated by the com­
pany's alleged discriminatory discharge of an employee because of his 
organizational activities in support of the incumbent union, which the 
employer was attempting to replace by means of coercive and threat­
ening actions.62 The Board determined that strikes in protest of such 
serious violations of the Act by the company were not contemplated 
by the employees when they agreed to the no-strike language in the 
contract and, therefore, did not constitute a contractual violation.63 
The Board's decision was later affirmed by both the court of appeals64 
and the Supreme Court.65 
57. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 197 F.2d 111, 112-13, 30 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2119, 2120 (2d Cir. 1952). 
58. NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co., 345 U.S. 71, 76-79, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
2432, 2434-36 (1953). 
59. Id. at 79-80, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436. The Court's decision will be more 
fully analyzed in THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF NO-STRIKE PROVISIONS, infra notes 
100-171 and accompanying text. 
60. \03 N.L.R.B. 511,31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1494 (1953), affd, 214 F.2d 462,34 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2484 (2d Cir. 1954), affd, 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587 
(1956). 
61. Id. at 515, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1495-96. 
62. Id. at 512, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1494. 
63. Id. at 514-15, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1495. 
64. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 214 F.2d 462, 34 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2484 (2d 
Cir. 1954). 
65. Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587 (1956). 
156 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:147 
For years after the decisions in Rockaway News and Mastro Plas­
tics Corp., the Board used the Court's Rockaway News analysis consist­
ently to hold that broad no-strike language included a prohibition of 
sympathy strike activities. 66 As late as 1969 the Board, in Local 
12419, International Union of District 50, United Mineworkers of 
America (National Grinding Wheel Co.), 67 held that a clause forbid­
ding the union to cause or permit a strike by its members prohibited a 
sympathy strike.68 
In National Grinding Wheel, the company and the Mineworker's 
union had separate contracts covering two different locals which rep­
resented the company's employees.69 The first local, whose contract 
covered the company's production and maintenance employees, had 
agreed to a no-strike clause which read: "During the term of this 
agreement, the Company will not conduct a lockout at its plant, and 
the Union or Local Union will not cause or permit its members to 
cause any strike or slowdown, total or partial, of work at the Com­
pany's plant."7o 
The sister local, consisting of the company's clerical and office 
workers, instituted a primary economic strike as a result of stalled 
contract negotiations with the company.1 1 The majority of workers in 
the production and maintenance local honored the clericals' picket 
line, refusing to report to work.72 Sixteen of the production and main­
tenance workers, however, crossed the picket line and worked during 
the clerical strike.73 The union instituted charges under its internal 
disciplinary procedures, resulting in fines against these sixteen individ­
uals. 74 One of the individuals filed a charge with the Board against the 
union, claiming that she had crossed the picket line because the no­
strike provisions of the contract prohibited her from engaging in a 
sympathy strike.75 The Board's general counsel issued a complaint 
against the union, alleging a violation of section 8(b)(I)(a) of the 
Act.76 The Board found the union to have violated the Act and in so 
66. See C. MORRIS, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1026-27 (2d ed. 1983). 





72. Id. at 628-29, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1311. 
73. Id. at 629, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1311. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. 29 U.S.c. § 158(b)(I)(a) (1982). 
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doing adopted the following statements of the administrative law 
judge: 
Whether they did so in furtherance of their own demands or of a 
cause of the sister-local, their work stoppage suspended the con­
tinuity of their operations in either instance. This stoppage of work 
on their part was in the face of the language forbidding Respondent 
to "cause" it or even "permit" it. . . . The basic point is that this 
no-strike clause meant what it said and governed the rights and obli­
gations of the union and the employees covered by [it].... The 
conclusion is that the work stoppage of the members, and Respon­
dent's adoption of it, was no less a breach of the no-strike clause, 
though done in deference to the sister-local's picket line and in fur­
therance of the latter's cause, than it would have been had the con­
duct been in furtherance of a direct demand of Respondent or its 
members.77 
The administrative law judge, whose opinion was adopted by the 
NLRB, cited the Supreme Court in Rockaway News to find, on the 
basis of the plain meaning of the contractual no-strike clause, that the 
union sympathy strike violated its no-strike promise. 78 
By 1969, then; the Board had identified three specific types of 
strike activity--economic, sympathy, and unfair labor practice-and 
determined their respective relationships to broad contractual no­
strike language. The primary strikes were, of course, precluded by no­
strike language, as apparently were sympathy strikes.79 Unfair labor 
practice strikes, however, were an exceptional situation and the right 
to engage in such strikes could be waived only if it was shown that 
employees actually intended to execute such a waiver.80 These posi­
tions, while somewhat distorting the plain meaning of the language of 
broad no-strike clauses, are reasonable and consistent with the pur­
poses of the Act.8) These positions are also consistent with arbitral 
treatment of the subject.82 During the 1960s, however, a line of court 
cases defining exceptions to the anti-injunction provisions of the Nor­
77. National Grinding Wheel Co., 176 N.L.R.B. at 629-30, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 
1312-13 (emphasis added). 
78. Id. at 630, 71 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1313. 
79. Id.; Redwing Carriers, 137 N.L.R.B. 1545, 1546 n.5, SO L.R.R.M. (BNA), 1440­
41 n.5 (1962), en/arced sub nom, Teamsters, Local 79 v. NLRB 325 F.2d 1011, 54 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2707 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 90S, 55 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3023 
(1954); Rockaway News Supply Co., 95 N.L.R.B. at 337,28 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1315. 
80. See supra note 63 and accompanying text. 

8!' See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 

82. See supra notes 11-49 and accompanying text. 
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ris-LaGuardia Act83 developed. These cases would provide the Board 
with a new doctrine for interpreting no-strike language and would de­
cidedly alter its position with regard to the effect of no-strike language 
in sympathy strike situations. 
In 1962, the Supreme Court, in Local 714, Teamsters v. Lucas 
Flour Co., 84 affirmed an award of damages resulting from an illegal 
strike, holding that the presence of an arbitration clause in a collective 
bargaining agreement creates an implied prohibition of strikes over 
matters subject to that clause, even in the absence of explicit no-strike 
language.85 Such an implied no-strike obligation was necessary, ac­
cording to the Court, "to promote the arbitral process as a substitute 
for economic warfare."86 This doctrine, which was to become known 
as the "coterminous application doctrine,"87 was the basis of the 
Court's decision to allow injunctive relief to stop strikes over matters 
which the parties were contractually bound to arbitrate, even if the 
contract did not contain an express no-strike clause.88 In Keller-Cres­
cent Co. 89 and Gary-Hobart Water Corp. ,90 the Board seized upon this 
doctrine and began to apply it to sympathy strike situations in which 
the no-strike provisions of the contract in question were a part of, or 
closely intertwined with, the arbitration provisions of the contract. 
By 1978, however, the Board was ready to expand its application 
83. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). 
84. 369 u.s. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 (1962). 
85. Id. at 105,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2721. 
86. Id. at 105, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2722. See also United Steelworkers of Am. v. 
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 580-81,46 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2416, 2418-19 
(1960) (demonstrating the judicial approval of the arbitration process). Interestingly, in 
Warrior & Gulf, Justice Douglas indicated, "when, however, an absolute no-strike clause is 
included in the agreement, then in a very real sense everything that management does is 
subject to the agreement, for either management is prohibited or limited in the action it 
takes, or if not, it is protected from interference by strikes." 363 U.S. at 583, 46 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) at 2420. While admittedly dicta of the Court, this indicates a rather broad opinion 
of absolute no-strike clauses. 
87. Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 382, 85 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049, 2055 (1974); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 776, 113 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227, 3230 (7th Cir. 1983). 
88. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. at 105,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2721. For an analysis 
of the origins of the coterminous application doctrine, see generally Ryder Truck Lines v. 
Teamsters Freight Local Union 480, 727 F.2d 594, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912 (6th Cir. 
1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227 (7th Cir. 
1983). For further discussion of Lucas Flour Co. see infra notes 119-123 and accompany­
ing text. 
89. 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 687, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201, 1202 (1975), enforcement de­
nied, 538 F.2d 1291,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3591 (7th Cir. 1976). 
90. 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 745, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1210, 1214 (1974), enforced, 511 
F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925, 90 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921 (1975). 
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of the doctrine. In International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 
18 v. Davis-McKee, Inc.,91 the Board made a clean break from its posi­
tion in National Grinding Wheel, stating "to the extent that National 
Grinding Wheel stood for the proposition that the right to engage in 
sympathy strikes is waived by a union's agreement to a broad no-strike 
clause, without more, it has been overruled, sub silentio, by Keller­
Crescent and Gary-Hobart."92 In Davis-McKee, Inc., the Board was 
faced with (1) contractual language similar to Gary-Hobart in that the 
no-strike provisions were clearly intertwined with and a part of the 
contractual arbitration procedure,93 and (2) facts virtually identical to 
National Grinding Wheel in that the union had fined members who 
had refused to participate in a sympathy strike.94 As the concurring 
opinion of member Penello clearly indicates, the Board could have ar­
rived at the same decision without overturning the holdings of Na­
tional Grinding Wheel. 95 The majority, however, chose to apply the 
coterminous application doctrine to find that sympathy strikes would 
no longer be prohibited under any circumstances by general no-strike 
language.96 It is at this point that the Board's position became incon­
sistent with that of the labor arbitrators who held that general no­
strike language prohibited sympathy strikes.97 Despite its lack of ac­
ceptance by several circuit courts,98 the Board's position remained un­
changed until 1985.99 
IV. THE COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF NO-STRIKE PROVISIONS 
The courts orginally found that broad no-strike language prohib­
ited sympathy strikes but did not prevent employees from striking in 
91. 238 N.L.R.B. 652,99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1307 (1978). 
92. Id. at 653-54, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1309. 
93. Compare the contractual clauses in Davis-McKee. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. at 658 n.36, 
99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1313 n.36 and Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. at 742-43 
n.4, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1211 n.4. 
94. See supra notes 67-76 and accompanying text. 
95. Davis-McKee. Inc., 238 N.L.R.B. at 658, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 1313 (Penello, 
member, concurring). 
96. Id. at 653-54, 99 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1308-09. 
97. See supra notes 39-49 and accompanying text. 
98. See Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union 480, 727 F.2d 594, 
599, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912, 2916 (6th Cir. 1984); U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 
772, 777, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227, 3230-31 (7th Cir. 1983); Amcar Div., A.C.F. Indus. 
v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 561, 566-67, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2518. 2522 (8th Cir. 1981); NLRB 
v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1364-65, 107 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2667 (9th 
Cir. 1981); Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455, 457-58. 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
2817,2818-19 (3d Cir. 1981). 
99. See infra note 187 and accompanying text. 
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protest of unfair labor practices committed by the employer. loo The 
courts also accepted the arbitral implication of no-strike obligations 
when the contract contained arbitration provisions but no express no­
strike commitment. 101 Such implied obligations were, however, held 
to be "coterminous" with the scope of the contract's arbitration 
clause. 102 The courts found a similar limitation of no-strike clauses 
when employers sought injunctions against union strike activity.103 
Injunctions were allowed, notwithstanding the anti-injunction provi­
sions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act,I04 when the underlying dispute 
was over an issue arbitrable under the provisions of the collective bar­
gaining agreement. IOS The Board expanded these limited court hold­
ings by applying the coterminous application doctrine to cases 
interpreting express no-strike provisions. 106 Such application has been 
enforced by the courts only in cases where the no-strike clause is a part 
of, or closely intertwined with, the contract's arbitration provisions. 107 
The courts have, however, consistently required further evidence to 
show that broad no-strike language does not prohibit sympathy 
strikes. 
The judicial history of the interpretation of no-strike clauses has 
developed into a consistent, if not entirely predictable, pattern. The 
leading authorities in this area are two United States Supreme Court 
cases, NLRB v. Rockaway News Supply Co. 108 and Mastro Plastics 
Corp. v. NLRB.109 In Rockaway News, the Supreme Court affirmed 
the decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in setting aside the 
Board's order to reinstate an employee discharged for refusing, in vio­
lation of the contract's no-strike provisions, to cross the picket line of 
another union. 11O The Board's finding was based on its conclusion 
that the collective bargaining agreement was void because of an overly 
broad union security clause. I II 
The Court found two problems with the Board's holding. First, 
while the inclusion of an illegal provision in the contract could possi­
100. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 547. 
101. MORRIS, supra note 66, at 900. 
102. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17, at 62-63. 
103. Id. at 436, 543-49. 
104. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). See supra text accompanying note 83. 
105. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 17 at 543-49. 
106. Id. at 62-63. 
107. Id. 
108. 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (1953). 
109. 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587 (1956). 
110. 345 U.S. at 80-81, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436. 

Ill. Id. at 76, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2434. 
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bly justify the Board's attempt to void the contract as to future events, 
the Board could not completely ignore the contract in evaluating 
events which occurred prior to holding the contract void. 112 Second, 
the contract contained savings and separability clauses which provided 
that only the individual sections of the contract found to be illegal 
would be determined inoperative while other provisions would remain 
in full force and effect. I 13 
Finding that the no-strike provisions of the contract remained vi­
able notwithstanding the illegality of the union security clause, the 
Court then determined that the no-strike language prohibited the sym­
pathy strike activities of the discharged employee and provided a de­
fense to the unfair labor practice charges against the company. I 14 
In Mastro Plastics Corp., the Court decided, among other things, 
that a no-strike clause similar in breadth to the language of the no­
strike clause in Rockaway New was not violated when employees 
struck in protest of the company's unfair labor practices. 1I5 The 
Court found the no-strike provisions of the contract to be 
aimed at avoiding interruptions of production prompted by efforts 
to change existing economic relationships . . . . 
To adopt petitioners' all-inclusive interpretation of the clause is 
quite a different matter. That interpretation would eliminate, for 
the whole year, the employees' right to strike even if petitioners, by 
coercion, ousted the employees' lawful bargaining representatives 
and, by threats of discharge, caused the employees to sign member­
ship cards in a new union. Whatever may be said of the legality of 
such a waiver when explicitly stated, there is no adequate basis for 
implying its existence without a more compelling expression of it 
then appears in § 5 of this contract. I 16 
The Court further determined that the contract must be read in 
light of the declared policy of the NLRA to balance a competitive 
business economy against the rights of labor to organize in an effort to 
better its conditions through the process of collective bargaining. 117 
Based on this policy, the Court determined that waivers of employee 
rights to strike, such as contained in the no-strike provisions of the 
contract in question, could only contribute to the policies of the Act 
"provided the selection of the bargaining representative remains 
112. Id. at 76-77,31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2434-35. 
113. Id. at 78-79,31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436. 
114. Id. at 81, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2436. 
115. 350 U.S. at 284, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2593. 
116. Id. at 282-83, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2592. 
117. Id. at 279, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 259\. 
162 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVJEW [Vol. 7:147 
free."118 Allowing the company to engage in unfair labor practices 
which prevented the free selection of the employees' bargaining repre­
sentative without allowing employees the right to engage in a retalia­
tory strike would present a degree of imbalance which the Act did not 
anticipate. For these reasons, the Court would not imply a waiver of 
the employees' right to strike in protest of the employer's unfair labor 
practice. 119 
Rockaway News and Mastro Plastics Corp. remain the only 
Supreme Court decisions in which the Court has actually interpreted 
the scope of broad no-strike language. There is, however, another line 
of cases which has dramatically impacted on the interpretation of ex­
press no-strike language. In 1962 the Court decided Local 174, Team­
sters v. Lucas Flour CO.,120 a case in which the Court was asked to 
determine whether a strike called by the union violated the collective 
bargaining agreement,. notwithstanding the absence of a no-strike .. 
clause. 121 The strike in Lucas Flour was called to protest the com­
pany's discharge of an employee because of unsatisfactory work. 122 
The collective bargaining agreement between the company and the 
employer did not contain an express no-strike clause, but did include 
an agreement to submit to binding arbitration "any difference as to the 
true interpretation of this agreement."123 The Court held that the 
duty to submit contractual disputes to final and binding arbitration 
implied a no-strike agreement covering issues to be decided by the 
contractual arbitration process. 124 
The Court further defined the rule of Lucas Flour in Gateway 
Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers ofAmerica. 125 Here again the Court 
was faced with a contract containing an agreement to submit contract 
disputes to binding arbitration, but not an express no-strike agree­
ment. 126 The Court, relying on its previous decision in Lucas Flour, 
implied a no-strike obligation resulting from an agreement to arbitrate 
contractual disputes. 127 In limiting this implied obligation the Court 
stated that, where there is an arbitration agreement and no express 
negation of an implied no-strike obligation, "the agreement to arbi­
118. Jd. at 280, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2591. 
119. Jd. at 284, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2593. 
120. 369 U.S. 95, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 (1962). 
121. Jd. at 106,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2722. 
122. Jd. at 97, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2718. 
123. Jd. at 96, 49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2718. 
124. Jd. at 105,49 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2721. 
125. 414 U.S. 368, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049 (1974). 
126. Jd. at 381-82, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2054. 
127. Jd. at 382, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2055. 
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trate and the duty not to strike should be construed as having cotermi­
nous application."128 The Court also identified a limited exception to 
the implied no-strike obligation in those cases in which the strike re­
sulted from a good faith fear of abnormally dangerous conditions in 
the workplace. 129 
The final cog in developing an understanding of recent judicial 
interpretations of express no-strike provisions is derived from the 
Supreme Court's decisions in Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, Lo­
cal 770,130 Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, \31 and Jacksonville Bulk 
Terminals v. ILA.132 In Boys Markets, the Court reexamined its deci­
sion in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, \33 finding that the anti-in­
junction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act134 did not preclude 
the courts from enjoining a strike in breach of a no-strike obligation 
under a collective bargaining agreement. \3S The Court, however, indi­
cated that its holding was a narrow one and that to properly grant 
injunctive relief against strike activity a court must first hold that the 
strike "is over a grievance which both parties are contractually bound 
to arbitrate. . . and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a 
condition of his obtaining an injunction against the strike."136 The 
Court also added that the employer must prove that an injunction 
would be warranted under the following ordinary principles of equity: 
contract breaches are occurring and will continue to occur, or have 
been threatened and will be committed; that such breaches have or 
will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and that the employer 
will suffer more injury if the injunction is denied than the union will 
suffer through its granting. \37 
The limitations of the Boys Markets exception are shown by the 
Court's subsequent decisions in Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers 138 
and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals v. ILA.139 In Buffalo Forge, the 
Court indicated that the Boys Markets exception does not apply in 
128. Id. at 385-86, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2056. 
129. Id. at 381-82, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2054-55. 
130. 398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2257 (1970). 
131. 428 U.S. 397,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3032 (1976). 
132. 457 U.S. 702, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2665 (1982). 
133. 370 U.S. 195, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2420 (1962). 
134. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1976). 
135. Boys Market, 398 U.S. at 253, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264. 
136. 398 U.S. at 254, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264 (quoting Sinclair Refining Co. v. 
Atkinson, 37 U.S. 195, 228, 50 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2420, 2433 (1962) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting». 
137. Id. at 254, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264. 
138. 428 U.S. 397, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3032 (1976). 
139. 457 U.S. 702, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2665 (1982). 
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cases of sympathy strikes because the underlying dispute between the 
union and the employer is not subject to the arbitration provisions of 
the collective bargaining agreement. l40 The Court reasoned that the 
real issue underlying the sympathy strike was the union's desire to 
support another union's cause, not the union's contention that the em­
ployer had violated some provision in its collective bargaining agree­
ment. 141 Since the reason for the strike was a dispute between the 
employer and union "B," the dispute could not be solved by arbitra­
tion between the employer and union "A" and, therefore, an injunc­
tion was not necessary to protect the arbitral process. 142 
In Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, the Court applied the same ra­
tionale to prohibit the issuance of an injunction to stop a strike called 
as a political protest to the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan. 143 
Since the dispute underlying the. strike was not an issue between the 
union and the employer, and therefore not arbitrable under the con­
tract, no injunction to stop the strike could be granted. l44 
In both Buffalo Forge and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, the col­
lective bargaining agreements contained express no-strike clauses. 14s 
The Court indicated that whether a union's actions violated such 
clauses was an arbitrable question. 146 Subsequent to an arbitration de­
cision finding the union's activities to be a contract violation, a court 
140. 428 U.S. at 407-08, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3036. 
141. Id. at 407, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3036. 
142. Id. at 410, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3037. 
143. 457 U.S. at 704-05, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2665-66. 
144. 457 U.S. at 721-22, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2672-73. 
145. The Buffalo Forge no-strike clause reads: 
There shall be no strikes, work stoppages or interruption or impeding of work. 
No Officers or representatives of the Union shall authorize, instigate, aid or con­
done any such activities. No employee shall participate in any such activity. The 
Union recognizes its possible liabilities for violation of this provision and will use 
its influence to see that work stoppages are prevented. Unsuccessful efforts by 
Union officers or Union representatives to prevent and terminate conduct prohib­
ited by this paragraph, will not be construed as "aid" or "condonation" of such 
conduct and shall not result in any disciplinary actions against the Officers, com­
mitteemen or stewards involved. 
428 U.S. at 398 n.l, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3033 n.1. The Jacksonville no-strike clause 
reads: 
During the term of this Agreement: ... the Union agrees there shall not be any 
strike of any kind or degree whatsoever, . . . for any cause whatsoever; such 
causes including but not limited to, unfair labor practices by the Employer or 
violation of this Agreement. The right of employees not to cross a bona fide 
picket line is recognized by the Employer. . . . 
457 U.S. at 706, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2666. 
146. Jackson Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 710-11, 110 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 2668; 
Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 410, 92 LR.R.M. (BNA) at 3047. 
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could grant lDJunctive relief to enforce the arbitrator's award, but 
since the arbitrator's award would not settle the underlying reason for 
the strike, an injunction was not necessary "to implement the strong 
Congressional preference for the private dispute settlement mecha­
nisms agreed upon by the parties."147 
In neither of these cases, however, was the Court forced to inter­
pret the no-strike provisions of the contracts. In Boys Markets, the 
contract violation was conceded by the parties l48 and in Buffalo Forge 
and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, the Court's holding obviated the ne­
cessity to interpret the applicable no-strike provisions. 149 
As previously indicated, the Board began to apply the cotermi­
nous application doctrine of Lucas Flour to interpret express no-strike 
obligations holding that, regardless of the circumstances, the no-strike 
pledge was no broader than the arbitration clause of the contract. 150 
This left the circuit courts with the problem of evaluating the Board's 
broad application of the Supreme Court's doctrine. 
In early decisions, it appeared that the courts might be accepting 
the Board's extension of the doctrine to cases involving express no­
strike clauses. In Gary-Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB,151 the Seventh 
Circuit enforced an order of the Board which found that a union's 
sympathy strike activity did not violate the no-strike obligation con­
tained in that contract, stating: "Absent an explicit expression of such 
[other] intention ... the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to 
strike should be construed as having coterminous application."152 The 
court then cited the no-strike/arbitration clauses and reasoned: "This 
language indicates an intention to treat the no-strike clause as having 
application co-extensively with that of the arbitration clause. That ap­
plication is to 'any and all disputes and controversies arising under or 
in connection with the terms of provisions' of the bargaining agree­
ment."153 From these statements, it is not clear whether the court 
was holding that no-strike clauses were limited by the scope of the 
arbitration clause as a matter of law or because of the specific language 
of the contract in question. 
147. Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 407, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3036. 
148. 398 U.S. at 254, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2264. 
149. Jackson Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 722-24, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2672-73; 
Buffalo Forge, 428 U.S. at 409-12, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3037-38. 
150. See supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text. 
151. 511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
925, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921 (1975). 
152. [d. at 287, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2832 (citing Gateway Coal Co., 414 U.S. at 
382, 85 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2055). 
153. Id. at 288, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2832. 
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The court, however, did not leave this question open for long. In 
NLRB v. Keller-Crescent Co., 154 another case involving the legitimacy 
of a sympathy strike in light of an express no-strike provision in the 
contract, the court reviewed its opinions in Gary-Hobart and Hyster 
Co. v. Independent Towing and Lifting Machine Association,155 and 
stated: 
We should not, however, read the language of judicial opinions 
without regard to the factual circumstances of the litigation in 
which it appears or to the analytic framework in which the language 
is used .... 
Further, the Hyster opinion focused on the lack of a clear and 
unmistakable waiver, summarizing the holding of Gary-Hobart as 
establishing such a waiver as an essential prerequisite to the denial 
of employees' right to honor a stranger union's picket line. Yet the 
Gary Hobart holding depends in turn upon the factual circum­
stances of that controversy ....156 
The Keller-Crescent court then looked to the specific facts of that case 
and refused to enforce the Board's order, finding a waiver of the right 
to sympathize even though there was no specific language prohibiting 
such strikes in the contract.1 57 
Completing the Seventh Circuit picture is its recent decision in 
u.s. Steel Corp. v. NLRB.158 In U.S. Steel, the court specifically deals 
with, and rejects, the Board's broad application of the coterminous 
application doctrine: 
In the Board's view ... any waiver of the right to engage in a 
sympathy strike may be found only "in express contractual lan­
guage or in unequivocal extrinsic evidence bearing upon ambiguous 
contractual language." The Board's position is predicated upon the 
doctrine of coterminous application. . . . The doctrine, originating 
in the construction of contracts that were devoid of any express no­
strike pledge, . . . means nothing more than that a court will not 
154. 538 F.2d 1291,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3591 (7th Cir. 1976). 
155. 519 F.2d 89, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2885, cert. denied, 428 U.S. 910 (1976). The 
Hyster court refused to apply the Boys Market anti-injunction exception (see supra notes 
133-149 and accompanying text) to allow injunctive relief from sympathy strike activity. 
The contract contained a broad no-strike clause but the court determined that the dispute 
was not over a grievance arbitrable under the contract, therefore, no injunction could be 
issued. Id. at 93, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2887. The court further indicated that the no­
strike language did not constitute a clear and unmistakable waiver of the right to engage in 
a sympathy strike, as required under Gary-Hobart. Id. 
156. 538 F.2d at 1299,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3597. 
157. Id. at 1298, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3596. 
158. 711 F.2d 772, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227 (7th Cir. 1983). 
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imply a no-strike obligation broader than the arbitration clause 
from which it emanates. . . . The doctrine of coterminous applica­
tion may also be invoked with respect to contracts containing an 
express no-strike clause when injunctive relief is sought for a viola­
tion of the no-strike obligation. . . . 
Of course, in cases when an arbitration clause and an express 
no-strike clause are closely interwoven, it may be reasonable to infer 
that the parties intended the two provisions to have the same scope 
159 
The U. S. Steel court decided the broad no-strike language of that 
contract prohibited sympathy strikes, finding the Board's coterminous 
application doctrine inapplicable to the interpretation of explicit no­
strike clauses which are "functionally independent from the arbitra­
tion clause of the contract."160 The court also found that, since no 
injunctive relief was being sought, the limitations of Boys Market and 
Buffalo Forge did not apply.161 
A similar analysis was made by the Sixth Circuit in its recent en 
banc decision in Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union 
480. 162 In Ryder Truck, the court was dealing with an action filed by 
the employer under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations 
Act163 claiming breach of the contract's express no-strike commit­
ment. l64 The district court awarded damages to the employer but was 
reversed by a panel of the circuit court, which held that the no-strike 
clause prohibited strikes only over arbitrable disputes. 165 In the cir­
cuit's en banc decision, it traced the history of the coterminous appli­
cation doctrine, finding that it originated in decisions interpreting 
contracts which contained an arbitration clause but not an explicit no­
strike obligation and had also been applied in the context of the Boys 
Markets exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act'sl66 anti-injunction 
provisions. 167 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals examined the decisions of 
Boys Markets, Buffalo Forge, and Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, finding 
support for its opinion that the coterminous application doctrine "ap­
plies only to determining the permissibility of enjoining strikes and not 
159. Id. at 776-77, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3230-31 (footnotes omitted). 
160. Id. at 777-78, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3231. 
161. [d. at 777, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3231. 
162. 727 F.2d 594, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912 (6th Cir. 1984) (en bane). 
163. 29 U.S.c. § 185 (1976). 
164. 727 F.2d at 600, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2917. 
165. [d. at 595, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2912. 
166. 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-115 (1982). 
167. 727 F.2d at 598, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2915. 
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to determining the scope of an explicit no-strike clause." 168 The key to 
the court's reasoning was the Supreme Court's conclusion in Jackson­
ville Bulk Terminals that the issue of whether the strike violated the 
explicit no-strike clause contained in the collective bargaining agree­
ment was a separate question from whether the strike was enjoin­
able. 169 Based on this .,;easoning, and citing the Seventh Circuit's U.S. 
Steel decision,170 tiie Sixth Circuit held that the doctrine of cotermi­
nous application was inapplicable to cases requiring the interpretation 
of express no-strike provisions. 171 
v. ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE 
The history of interpreting no-strike agreements started with little 
conflict or complexity. Early arbitral decisions presaged later Board 
and judicial opinions by implying no-strike agreements into contracts 
that contained binding arbitration clauses, using the plain meaning of 
the written language to interpret express no-strike provisions and re­
fusing to sanction illegitimate union use of picket lines. l72 
The courts and the Board also seemed to have little trouble when 
initially faced with the question of how to interpret broad no-strike 
language. When such obligations were created by express contract 
language separate from the arbitration provisions of the collective bar­
gaining agreement, the no-strike obligation was interpreted to prohibit 
all work stoppages except those in protest of the unlawful conduct of 
the employer. 173 
For twenty-one years after the Supreme Court's decision in Rock­
away News, the NLRB interpreted broad no-strike language to include 
168. Id. at 599, 1\5 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2916. 
169. Jacksonville Bulk Terminals, 457 U.S. at 721-22, 110 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2672­
73. The Sixth Circuit indicated that the Supreme Court's holding in Jacksonville Bulk 
Terminals was wholly inconsistent with the "contention that under the doctrine of cotermi­
nous interpretation an express no-strike clause does not prohibit a strike over a nonarbitra­
b1e dispute. The Court's holding does illustrate, however, that where there is an express 
no-strike clause, strikes are enjoinable only if over an arbitrable matter." Ryder Truck, 727 
F.2d at 598, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2916. 
170. U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772,113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227 (7th Cir. 
1983). 
171. 727 F.2d at 599,115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 2916-17. 
172. See supra notes 16-49 and accompanying text. 
173. See, e.g., Mastro Plastics Corp., 350 U.S. 270, 37 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2587 
(Supreme Court affirmed the enforcement of a Board order indicating that unfair labor 
practice strikes are not prohibited by general no-strike language); Rockaway News Supply 
Co., 345 U.S. 71, 31 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2432 (Supreme Court found a sympathy strike to be 
prohibited by broad no-strike language); National Grinding Wheel Co., 176 N.L.R.B. 628, 
71 L.R.R.M. 1311 (BNA) (Board found broad no-strike language to prohibit sympathy 
strikes). 
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a prohibition of sympathy strikes. 174 It was not until the mid-1970s1 75 
that the Board began to adopt a more restrictive interpretation of 
broad no-strike language, relying upon Supreme Court decisions in 
cases where the Court was dealing not with the interpretation of con­
tractual provisions, but with (1) the scope of anti-injunction legisla­
tion 176 or (2) the situations in which an express no-strike obligation 
was not found in the contract, but a limited no-strike obligation was 
nonetheless implied by the Court as a result of the parties' agreement 
to settle contractual disputes through binding arbitration processes. 177 
At this point, the Board's interpretation seems to have gone 
astray. The coterminous application doctrine, relied upon by the 
Board in fashioning its recent interpretations of no-strike provisions, 
was developed by the Court to protect the arbitral process from the 
erosive effect of allowing unions to substitute the economic pressure of 
strikes for arbitration. 178 To allow unions the option of striking to 
enforce their contractual views would render any agreement to arbi­
trate disputes meaningless and, contrary to the stated policy of the 
NLRA, would increase industrial strife. 179 
In rejecting what the courts feel is an inappropriate use of the 
coterminous application doctrine by the Board, the circuits look to 
extrinsic factors to determine whether the union has, through the no­
strike clause, clearly and unmistakably waived the employee's right to 
engage in a sympathy strike. The circuits consider such factors as 
whether the no-strike clause is functionally independent of the arbitra­
tion clause; 180 whether the no-strike clause is a quid pro quo not 
merely for the arbitration clause, but also to achieve uninterrupted 
plant operation; 181 the intent of the parties as expressed by the con­
174. See infra note 188 and accompanying text. 
175. See, e.g., Keller-Crescent Co., 217 N.L.R.B. 685, 89 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1201 
(1975), enforcement denied, 538 F.2d 1291, 92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3591 (7th Cir. 1976); 
Gary-Hobart Water Corp., 210 N.L.R.B. 742, 86 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1210 (1974), enforced, 
511 F.2d 284, 88 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2830 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 925, 90 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2921 (1975). 
176. 'See Buffalo Forge Co. v. Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397,92 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3032 
(1976); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks, 398 U.S. 235, 74 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2257 
(1970). 
177. See Gateway Coal Co. v. United Mineworkers of Am., 414 U.S. 368, 85 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2049 (1974); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 49 
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2717 (1962). 
178. See supra notes 120-124 and accompanying text. 
179. See id. 
180. U.S. Steel Corp. v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 772, 777-78, 113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3227, 
3231 (7th Cir. 1983). 
181. Id. at 778-79,113 L.R.R.M. (BNA) at 3232. 
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tract language read as a whole; 182 the law relating to the contract 
when the no-strike agreement was made;183 the bargaining history of 
the clause; 184 opinions concerning the scope of the no-strike clause ex­
pressed by union officials;185 and any other relevant conduct of the 
parties which shows their understanding of the contract. 186 
The court's factors represent logical questions to ask if one were 
trying to unravel a complex or ambiguous provision governing the 
conduct of parties to a contract. The question remains, however, why 
such inquiries are necessary to interpret language which provides that 
"the union shall not collectively, concertedly or individually engage in 
or participate, directly or indirectly, in any strike, slowdown, stop­
page, or any other interference with or interruption of the work or 
operations of the employer during the term of this agreement."187 
This language is clear, uncomplex, and with no limitation prohibits job 
actions of any sort during the term of the agreement. This language is 
not only unambiguous, it is repeatedly umambiguous, expressly 
prohibiting any strike, slowdown, stoppage, or any other interference 
with the employer's operation. Not even the most tortuous distortion 
of the English language would define this provision to be anything but 
an all-inclusive agreement not to refuse to work, regardless of the 
circumstances. 
The astute practitioner, however, will disregard his or her dic­
tionary when confronted with the necessity of interpreting express no­
strike provisions in a collective bargaining agreement. Depending 
upon the forum in which one is proceeding, the results of a case will 
vary markedly. While the NLRB is by far more likely than arbitrators 
or the courts to allow employees to strike even in the face of express 
no-strike language, it is important to note that the Board's posture 
with respect to such issues is prone to change. 188 Given this Board's 
182. Ryder Truck Lines v. Teamsters Freight Local Union 480, 727 F.2d 594, 600, 
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2912,2917 (6th Cir. 1984). 
183. Id. 
184. NLRB v. Southern Calif. Edison Co., 646 F.2d 1352, 1366, 107 L.R.R.M. 
(BNA) 2667, 2675 (9th Cir. 1981). 
185. Pacemaker Yacht Co. v. NLRB, 663 F.2d 455, 459, 108 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2817, 
2819-20 (3d Cir. 1981). 
186. Amcar Div., A.C.F. Indus. v. NLRB, 641 F.2d 561, 567, 106 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
2518,2522 (8th Cir. 1981). 
187. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
188. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss whether NLRB decisions are 
more appropriately characterized as "labor law" or "labor policy." It is, however, impor­
tant to note that the current Board's posture with respect to the no-strike clause changed 
during the drafting of this article. See Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 118 L.R.R.M. 1201 
(BNA) (1951) in which the Board concludes: 
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willingness to reexamine and overturn previous Board positions,189 it 
is not surprising that the coterminous application doctrine has been 
successfully narrowed. 190 
Even if we accept the situation that strikes in protest of an em­
ployer's unfair labor practices are not prohibited by such language, it 
is difficult to understand why sympathy strikes should likewise be ex­
cluded. In unfair labor practice cases the employer enters the dispute 
with "unclean hands" and is hardly, if you will excuse the expression, 
a sympathetic figure. In the case of sympathy strikes, however, the 
employer is not only innocent of any wrongdoing, the very nature of 
the activity indicates that the dispute causing the strike is not caused 
by any actions of the employer toward the striking employees. Fur­
ther, allowing such strikes, especially in the face of express no-strike 
obligations, is in direct conflict with the stated policy of the Act to 
prevent industrial strife. 191 Finally, logic dictates that any organiza­
tion which has given up the right to act on its own behalf must surely 
have given up the lesser right of acting on the behalf of others. 
Unfortunately, this "logic" has not been the deciding factor in 
many recent interpretations of no-strike language. Despite the recent 
no-strike position assumed by the Board, the labor attorney should 
advise clients to seek an express statement banning not only all strikes, 
but also all sympathy strikes. Absent such language, only overwhelm­
ing extrinsic evidence can be relied upon to protect employers from 
needless economic hardship. 
that the broad no-strike clause bar employees from honoring stranger picket lines 
.... Although previous Board decisions have held that sympathy strikes lie 
outside the scope of broad no-strike clauses, we can discern no logical or practical 
basis for the proposition that the prohibition of all "strikes" does not include 
sympathy strikes merely because the word "sympathy" is not used. 
Id. at 1201. 
189. See, e.g., United Technologies, 269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, liS L.R.R.M. (BNA) 
1281 (1984) and Milwaukee Spring Div. of Illinois Coil Spring Co., 268 N.L.R.B. No. 87, 
115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1065 (1984). 
190. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. 
191. 29 U.S.C. § lSI (1982). See also policy statement of29 U.S.c. § 141(b) (1982). 
